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Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät - Jahrgang 2015

 

Titel Essays in Applied Microeconomics
Autor Venuga Yokeeswaran
Publikationsform Dissertation
Abstract This thesis consists of three independent chapters, each covering a significant research field in applied microeconomics.
Chapter 1: We study a model of managerial incentive problems where a manager chooses the first two moments of his firm's profit distribution --mean and volatility-- along an efficient frontier. Assuming that managers differ with respect to their marginal cost of effort and their risk aversion we explore our model's comparative statics predictions in full detail. If managers' preference parameters are commonly known and associated, then a positive correlation between expected returns, volatility of profits, and incentives is the natural outcome. Allowing in addition for adverse selection with respect to the managers' preference parameters does not change the predicted correlation if the variation in observed contracts is not too large. Moreover, observed incentive schemes reflect exclusion of some manager types. Neglecting the endogeneity of risk in empirical studies biases estimates towards zero.
Chapter 2: We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in heterogeneous committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting and voting preceded by either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the first deliberation protocol imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous subgroups. We find that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes achieved under private voting. Furthermore, we find that when focusing on simple equilibria under Plenary Deliberation, Subgroup Deliberation Pareto improves on outcomes achieved under Plenary Deliberation.
Chapter 3: We investigate why countries that produce polluting and exhaustible resources might overstate their reserves as claimed by empirical studies.
We answer this question in a theoretical setup in which a delayed environmental regulation --in order to reflect slow international negotiations-- is implemented by a Pigovian tax. The regulator aims to control environmental damages caused by CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion by not neglecting the social welfare from its usage. Information on the size of the reserves --low or high-- is the resource owner's private information.
We find that the threat of carbon regulation creates incentives to exaggerate the size of the reserves. This behavior does not have to be detrimental to future environmental regulation. Both parties, the resource owner who wants to maximize his profits and the social planner who wants to control environmental pollution, can profit from asymmetric information.
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© Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn | Veröffentlicht: 14.10.2015