Hinweis zum Urheberrecht | Allgemeine Informationen | FAQ
Beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes beziehen Sie sich bitte immer auf folgende URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-16103

Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich - Jahrgang 2008

 

Titel

Essays on Moral Norms, Legal Unbundling and Franchise Systems

Autor

Sebastian Kranz

Publikationsform

Dissertation

Abstract

This dissertation studies three, rather unrelated, topics, which are investigated in 4 independent chapters.
Chapter 1 analyses a model of incomplete information with selfish rational types and types who comply with social or moral norms by intrinsic motivation. It explores ’complier optimal norms’, which maximize expected average utility of all compliant types given that the norms are commonly known. They are compared with rule-utilitarian norms, which maximize the sum of all players’ utility. Predictions under complier optimal norms match experimental evidence better and can explain a wide range of stylized facts, like conditional cooperation, costly punishment, the role of intentions, or concerns for social efficiency. It is shown that complier optimal norms arise from a model of voting-by-feet and can also be justified on moral grounds.
Chapter 2 studies an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Different forms of ownership of the upstream firm by the downstream incumbent are analysed. In particular, there is a focus on a hybrid form between ownership separation and vertical integration called legal unbundling. more...

Komplette Version

Hier können Sie den Adobe Acrobat Reader downloaden pdf-Dokument (1 MB)

© Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn | Veröffentlicht: 2008