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Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich - Jahrgang 2008



Essays on Organization and Incentives in R&D and on Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets


Ekaterina Goldfayn




This dissertation covers two distinct topics. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 investigate a model with a principal and two agents, where the hidden action of agents is a source of moral hazard problem. It is shown that competition between agents can be used to improve their incentives even if their production technologies are independent. The first chapter shows that the principal is often better off financing innovation race between competing agents, rather than only one (even the most advanced) of them. The second chapter investigates advantages of competition as compared to team production, which is technologically more efficient. Chapter 3 deals with different topic: it studies two-sided markets and develop a theory of compatibility between subsequent generations of technology.
More specifically, the first chapter analyzes innovation races in a moral hazard setting. We develop a model where two competing entrepreneurs work independently on the same project. The entrepreneurs do not possess any wealth of their own and their research is financed by a venture capitalist. The project, if successful, generates a prize, which is to be shared between the winning entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The venture capitalist cannot observe the allocation of funds he provides, which creates a moral hazard problem. more...

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© Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn | Veröffentlicht: 2008